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Abstract—To increase network security and mitigate identity
theft attacks, much of the research is focused on traditional
bit-level algorithmic. In conventional wireless networks, security
issues are primarily considered above the physical layer and are
usually based on bit-level algorithms to establish the identity
of a legitimate wireless device. Physical layer security is a new
paradigm in which features extracted from an analog signal
can be used to establish the unique identity of a transmitter.
Our previous research work into Radiometric fingerprinting has
shown that every transmitter has a unique fingerprint owing
to imperfections in the analog components present in the RF
front end. However, to the best of the author’s knowledge, no
such example is available in the literature in which the effect of
radio channel on Radiometric fingerprint is evaluated. This paper
presents the simulation and experimental results for radiometric
fingerprinting under an indoor varying radio channel. Contrary
to popular assumption, it was found that the fingerprinting
accuracy is little affected in an indoor channel environment.
Index Terms—Physical Layer Security, Radio Fingerprinting,
Channel
I. INTRODUCTION
Physical layer security is a new paradigm that provides
an extra layer of security to wireless devices. Geographical
information, channel response and transmitter radiometric in-
formation are different instances of physical layer security
that are used to establish the identity of a wireless device.
In the past few years, research into physical layer security
has been gaining momentum. Physical layer security that is
based on identifying a transmitter through the unique features
extracted from its analog signal is called RF fingerprinting [1].
Transmitter imperfections that can produce RF fingerprints are
originated from analogous components. The analog compo-
nents (digital-to-analog converters, band-pass filters, frequency
mixers and power amplifiers) present in the radio transmit
chain are mainly responsible for the unique features [2].
RF fingerprinting broadly refers to the process of identifying
the source of a transmission based on features extracted from
its RF signal. The features of a signal can be classified as:
• Features specific to the channel, which describe the
response of the wireless channel and its surrounding
environment.
• Features specific to the transmitter, which characterize
the wireless transmitter through the unique radiometric
features caused by the transmitter hardware.
Xiao et al. used the channel frequency response to discriminate
between a legitimate and a malicious user in an indoor
WLAN office environment [3–5]. The results show that cor-
rect identification decreases with increases in distance. After
a certain distance the channel responses for malicious and
legitimate users become identical. Mathur et al. established a
common cryptographic key between two communicating users
using the channel response of a multipath channel [6]. They
showed experimentally that the channel response between two
communicating devices are unique and decorrelates rapidly in
space. Similar approaches are used in [7, 8], in which different
strategies are proposed to extract secret keys from channel
state information, and to use the variability of the channel to
disseminate secret keys.
RF fingerprinting based on features specific to a transmitter
is also called radiometric identification. Radiometric identi-
fication uses only features originating from the transmitter
hardware and totally ignores features of the channel, such
as channel response. However, the transmitted signal passes
through a wireless channel, which might change some of its
attributes.
The main goal of RF fingerprinting is the detection of
unique signal (transmitter) features that form a valid device
RF fingerprint, based on which associations between observed
signals and their senders can be made. The RF fingerprint
of a transmitter should distinctly characterize it from other
transmitters through its unique features present in the radio
waveform. It is generally assumed that channel impairments
and interference degrade the unique features embedded in the
analog signal of a transmitter, which in turn decrease the RF
fingerprinting accuracy. However, no evidence for this assump-
tion is available in the literature. Most previously published
studies have used either an anechoic chamber or a laboratory
environment with high SNR and line-of-sight propagation in
the experimental validation of RF fingerprinting techniques [9–
13]. Such environments do not represent the typical conditions
found in practice, in which transceivers are not of RF test labo-
ratory specification, and channel impairments and interference
degrade the unique features embedded in the analog signal of
the transmitter. The effects of realistic operating conditions
on RF fingerprinting have not been assessed in the literature.
This paper addresses this deficiency by analyzing the effect
of channel impairments on the classification accuracy of RF
fingerprinting using signals captured with low-end (i.e. low
specification) receivers.
A. Contribution
The main contribution of this paper is an assessment of
the performance of Radiometric fingerprinting under realis-
tic operating conditions. The collected signals were passed
through a simulated multipath channel and its effect on the
performance of RF fingerprinting was analysed. Contrary
to popular assumption, it was found that the fingerprinting
accuracy is little affected in an indoor channel environment.
The simulation analysis was complemented with experiments
performed using the CORNET testbed of Virginia Polytechnic
Institute and State University, Blacksburg, USA [14, 15].
II. EXPERIMENTAL SETUP
An IEEE 802.11a/g standard preamble signal was generated
in MATLAB and transmitted from the seven different USRP
transmitters. The preamble signal was then captured with eight
different receivers. The complex In-phase (I) and Quadrature
(Q) signal components from different receivers were stored
in a computer. The preambles were extracted from the I
and Q components of the signals. The RF fingerprinting
was analysed for varying Signal to Noise Ratios (SNR) that
exists in a typical operational environment. The SNR was
analysed by adding a power-scaled, random, complex Additive
White Gaussian Noise (AWGN) to the preamble signal. The
Power Spectral Density (PSD) coefficients were extracted from
the noisy preamble signals to form the RF fingerprint for
each transmitter; classification was then performed using a
MultiLayer Perceptron Neural classifier. The details of the
hardwares, experimental setup, preamble extraction and RF
fingerprints formation can be found in our previous published
works [16–19].
A. Data collection and RF Fingerprint
Each 802.11a/g RF burst starts with a preamble signal . The
preamble signal is made up of a fixed training sequence, which
is used for timing/ frequency acquisition, diversity selection
and channel estimation. The IEEE 802.11a/g preamble signal
is 16 microseconds long and consists of 10 short and 2 long
training sequences [20]. Seven SBX daughter boards are used
as low-end transmitter and receiver as explained in [17]. A
total of 10,000 signals from each transmitter were captured
and stored at each of the receivers, giving a total data set of
490,000 received signals.
In previous works, the RF fingerprint of transmitters is
generated by extracting the frequency domain features from
the steady-state signal [9, 13, 21, 22]. In this paper, the RF
fingerprint consists of PSD coefficients and is given as:
ψX(k) =
|X(k)|
2
∑
K
k=1 |X(k)|
2
(1)
where X(k) are the coefficients of discrete Fourier transform
for the input signal x(m) given by
X(k) =
1
NF
NF∑
m=1
x(m)e
[
−2pij
NF
(m−1)(k−1)
]
(2)
III. FADING CHANNEL MODELS
In multipath fading, each path behaves as a discrete trans-
mission path. Typically, the fading process for a non-line-
of-sight path is characterized by a Rayleigh distribution,
whereas a Rician distribution is used for a line-of-sight path.
Rayleigh and Rician fading models represent realistic channel
conditions, which include multipath scattering effects, time
dispersion, and Doppler shifts arising from the mobility of
the transceivers [23].
MATLAB has developed a simulator for Rayleigh and
Rician fading channel models in Communication Toolbox,
which is a direct implementation of a band-limited, discrete,
multipath channel model of illustrated in [23]. The Doppler
spectrum and the delay power profile are assumed separable in
the multipath channel model, in which each path is modeled as
a linear finite impulse-response (FIR) filter. The Rician fading
channel model is used for evaluation in this paper.
Let {xi} denote the set of samples of the signal at the input
of the channel. Then, {yi} are the set of samples of the signal
after passing through a channel.
yi =
N2∑
n=N1
x(i−n)gn (3)
where {gn}is the set of tap weights given as
gn =
K∑
k=1
aksinc
[
τk
Ts
− n
]
−N1 ≤ n ≤ N2 (4)
where Ts is the input sample period of the channel, K
denotes the total number of paths in the multipath channel,
{τk} is the set of path delays, and ak is the set of uncorrelated
complex path gains in the multipath channel. Full implemen-
tation detail of the fading channel can be found in [24].
IV. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
The wireless channel changes owing to movement of the
objects surrounding the transceiver or owing to the transceiver
itself. Therefore, a wireless channel is a continuous, time-
varying process. In this paper, Radiometric fingerprint analysis
was performed for three types of indoor channel: a) low
multipath fading, b) medium multipath fading, and c) high
multipath fading. These three channel types correspond to the
situations in which the channel characteristics vary over time
from low fading to high fading or vice versa. Table 1 shows the
range of values a parameter can take in the simulated multipath
fading channels. The range of values represents the channel
characteristics in a typical indoor environment [23, 24]. All
the values are assigned randomly using a uniform distribution
from the given range.
Table I
THE ATTRIBUTES OF DIFFERENT MULTIPATH FADING CHANNELS
Multipath Fading Channel Type
Low Medium High
A
tt
ri
b
u
te
s Number of paths (K) 4 to 8 8 to 16 16 to 26
Path delays (Tk) in ns 1 to 20 1 to 50 1 to 100
Path gains (ak) in dB -40 to
-20
-40 to
-10
-20 to 0
Doppler shifts (fd) 4 4 4
Doppler shifts arise owing to the relative motion of the
transmitter and receiver. Doppler shifts are generally specified
in terms of the speed of the transceiver [23] and are given as
fd =
vf
c
(5)
where f is the transmission frequency (ISM band), c is the
speed of light (3x108) and v is the speed of the transceiver.
For an indoor environment, the speed of the transceiver was
assumed to be 0.5 m/s. In our simulations, the channel changes
randomly for every signal passed through it.
Figure 1. Signals are passed through low, medium and high multipath fading
channels. Classification, training and testing are performed with signals in the
same channel condition.
Figure 1 shows the simulation strategy used to analyze
RF fingerprinting under different channel conditions. The col-
lected signals were passed through the three channel models,
and then the PSD features were extracted to form profile RF
fingerprints of the transmitters. Classification was performed
using the MLP Artificial Neural Network.
Figure 2 shows the True Acceptance (TA) Rate for the three
channel models for signals captured with receiver Rx1. The
simulation results show that the channel has limited effect
on the classification accuracy of the RF fingerprinting. In a
low-fading channel, there is almost no variation in the RF
fingerprinting results. However, the classification results show
that the RF fingerprinting accuracy is marginally less in the
medium-fading and high-fading channels, compared with the
low-fading channel. The frequency responses of the medium
and high-fading channels show that fading affects some parts
of the frequency spectrum (frequency selective fading). This
causes the RF fingerprint of a specific transmitter to vary from
signal to signal in medium and high-fading channels, and as
a result the accuracy is less.
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Figure 2. RF fingerprinting classification accuracy for Rx1 in different fading
channel.
V. PROFILE RF FINGERPRINTS IN VARYING CHANNEL
CONDITIONS
The classification results of Figure 2 were obtained when
training and testing were performed with the same channel
conditions, i.e. a profile RF fingerprint was created in low-
fading channel conditions then the testing was performed in
the same low-fading channel conditions. However, in reality,
the channel characteristics change over time owing to the
mobility of the transmitter and receiver or because of the
movement of objects surrounding the transceivers. A profile
RF fingerprint generated in one channel condition might be
different from the testing fingerprint in different channel
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Figure 3. RF fingerprinting classification accuracy for Rx1 in different fading channel.
conditions. Therefore, a simulation was performed to analyse
the accuracy of RF fingerprinting under varying channel
conditions. Three scenarios were simulated, which correspond
to the following situations:
1) The first scenario considered the situation in which
profile RF fingerprints were generated in a low-fading
environment and later, the channel environment changed
from low-fading to medium or high-fading. In this
scenario, the profile RF fingerprints of transmitters were
generated with the signals passed through the low-fading
channels. Then testing in the classifier was implemented
with signals passed through medium and high-fading
channels.
2) In the second scenario, profile RF fingerprints for each
transmitter were generated in a medium-fading environ-
ment, and testing was carried out with signals from low
and high-fading environments.
3) In the third scenario, a high-fading channel was used for
creating the profile RF fingerprints, while testing was
implemented for low and medium-fading environments.
Figure 3 shows the simulation results of receiver Rx1 for
the three scenarios described above. The results show that
the True Acceptance rates decreased slightly when the profile
fingerprint was generated in a channel environment different
from the testing environment. A low-fading environment does
not distort the features in the signal and thus a receiver can
form a unique profile fingerprint and associate it with a specific
transmitter. Later, if the channel changed from low-fading to
high-fading, some of the features would be lost. However, the
classifier would be able to classify the transmitter correctly
owing to the availability of a unique profile fingerprint formed
earlier in a low fading-channel. This is evident from the high
accuracy of the results for scenario 1, in which the profile
fingerprint was generated in a low-fading environment, as
shown in Figure 3 (a) and (b). In both cases (Figures 3 (a) and
(b)) , the accuracy of the transmitters was almost the same as
compared to scenarios 2 and 3. However, the accuracy was
still less than in the results plotted in Figure 2, in which
training and testing were performed using the same channel.
The results for scenario 2 are plotted in Figure 3 (c) and (d),
and for scenario 3 in Figure 3 (e) and (f), respectively. The
accuracy varies in both scenarios 2 and 3, in which the profile
fingerprint was generated in medium-fading and high-fading
environments.
Our analysis showed that generating the profile fingerprint
in the same channel increased the accuracy significantly (as
shown in Figure 2). Nevertheless, training and testing in
different channel conditions yield acceptable accuracy. Results
were obtained for receiver Rx2 to Rx7, which show the same
trend. However, due to the space limitation, it is not given
here.
VI. CORNET TESTBED
The Cognitive Radio Network Testbed (CORNET) is an
open source Software Defined Radio (SDR) platform that
is deployed in a four-story building, Kelly Hall, at Virginia
Polytechnic Institute and State University, Blacksburg, USA
[14, 15]. The CORNET testbed consists of 48 USRP2 nodes,
which are scattered throughout the building. Twelve nodes are
installed on each each floor [25]. The USRP2 can operate at 50
MHz of instantaneous bandwidth. The USRP2 are equipped
with WBX daughterboards [26] as well a Radio Frequency
Integrated Circuit (RFIC) daughterboard custom developed
at Virginia Tech [15]. The WBX and RFIC daughterboards
cover the frequency ranges 50 MHz - 2200 MHz and 100
MHz - 4 GHz, respectively. The USRP2s are connected to
a centrally-located cluster of rack servers through Gigabit
Ethernet. The servers provide a high-performance General
Purpose Processor (GPP) environment for real-time software-
based signal processing. All the nodes are centrally accessed
using a web-based application.
During our research visit to the CORNET lab, In our
extensive experiments we found only three nodes (on Floor 2)
that were able to receive signals from each other. The rest of
the nodes were either malfunctioning (software and network
issues) or had weak signal reception owing to the concrete
structure of Kelly Hall., and were therefore inappropriate to
our purposes.
An IEEE802.11a/g preamble signal was generated and
received on different USRPs at 5 pm, 6 pm and the next
day at 11 am. A total of 5000 signals from each transmitter
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Figure 4. Classification for the data captured with Rx1. The profile fingerprint
is generated with data captured at different time than the data used for testing.
were collected at the different receivers at one particular time.
To avoid any commonalities between the transmit and receive
chains, either a transmit or receive chain of a daughterboard
was used for the measurements. Then preamble signals were
extracted and the classification results were obtained using a
MLP neural network.
Figure 4 shows the True Acceptance rate for receiver Rx1, in
which the profile RF fingerprint was generated for the signals
captured at a time different from the signals used for testing. In
Figure 4, the legend with a “marker” depicts the classification
results obtained when training and testing were implemented
for the signals captured at the same time. The legends without
a “marker” are for the classification results obtained when
training and testing were performed for the signals that were
captured at a different time. Figure 4 (a) shows the results
obtained when the profile fingerprint was generated for the
signals captured at 5pm and testing was performed for the
signals captured from 5pm to 11am. The results show that the
accuracy is the same for all cases, which implies that the RF
fingerprint of a transmitter is little affected by the channel.
The results for receiver Rx2 and Rx3 were also obtained that
showed the same trend as observed for receiver Rx1.
There are some limitations to the results obtained using the
CORNET testbed: 1) measurements spanned only two days;
time was limited and much of it was spent testing and rectify-
ing the testbed. 2) the research trip was made during Virginia
Tech’s summer holidays, so, there was limited movement in
the building hallways where USRPs were installed and thus
minimum variation in the channel characteristics.
However, in spite of its limitations, the CORNET testbed
provided some useful results that support our simulation
results. In future, more experiments will be performed on a
larger testbed spanning many days to validate the simulation
results.
VII. SUMMARY
This paper has analysed the effect of channel impairments
on an RF fingerprint in an indoor environment. Our results
show that channel impairments have limited effect on the
performance of RF fingerprinting. Our results are supported
by the experiments performed on the CORNET testbed. Fur-
thermore, the profile fingerprint was generated in a channel
condition different from the testing condition in order to
analyse the effect of variations in the channel characteristics
that might arise from movement of transmitter and receiver or
the surrounding environment. Our results show that a profile
fingerprint generated in a low-fading channel is likely to give
accurate results as compared to those generated in the medium
and high-fading channels.
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